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DIVIDEND POLICY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A DEFAULTABLE FIRM
ALEX S.L. TSE
Abstract. Default risk significantly affects the corporate policies of a firm. We develop a model in
which a limited liability entity subject to Poisson default shock jointly sets its dividend policy and capital
structure to maximize the expected lifetime utility from consumption of risk averse equity investors. We
give a complete characterization of the solution to the singular stochastic control problem. The optimal
policy involves paying dividends to keep the ratio of firm’s equity value to investors’ wealth below a
critical threshold. Dividend payout acts as a precautionary channel to transfer wealth from the firm to
investors for mitigation of losses in the event of default. Higher the default risk, more aggressively the
firm leverages and pays dividends.
1. Introduction
Since the capital structure irrelevance principle and dividend irrelevance principle of Modigliani and Miller
(1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961), a vast literature has emerged to explore the factors driving cor-
porate policies observed in practice. Historically, some important considerations include tax benefit,
asymmetric information, signaling motive, agency costs, financial distress costs, managerial risk aversion
and etc. While market frictions and strategic interaction among agents are all realistic concerns, very
fundamental factor such as default risk could indeed also play a crucial role behind corporate finance
decisions. In this paper, we examine the impact of default risk of a firm on its joint decision of dividend
policy and capital structure as well as equity investors’ consumption behavior.
Our model features a limited liability firm and risk averse equity investors. At each point of time
given the amount of equity capital in place, the firm simultaneously decides how much to invest in a
risky asset (which implies the amount of debt required and in turn its choice of capital structure) and
how much to pay out to investors with logarithm utility function. Investors can deposit the dividends
received in a riskfree retail saving account and consume to derive utility flow. The interests of firm
managers (who set the capital structure decision and payout policy) and investors (who choose their own
consumption policy) are perfectly aligned such that their joint economic objective here is to maximize
investors’ expected lifetime utility of consumption.
Date: October 9, 2018.
Key words and phrases. Dividend policy, capital structure, default risk, singular stochastic control, HJB equation.
The author would like to thank David Hobson, Bart Lambrecht, Harry Zhang and the seminar participants at Imperial
College London for the useful discussions and comments.
Department of Mathematics, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, UK. a.tse@imperial.ac.uk.
1
DIVIDEND POLICY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A DEFAULTABLE FIRM 2
We assume wealth can only flow from the firm to investors in form of dividends but capital cannot be
injected into the firm from investors via equity issuance. A reduced form approach is adopted to model
firm’s default where the equity value of the firm jumps to zero upon the arrival of a Poisson shock. As
a result, our model is perhaps the most suitable to describe the corporate policies of small businesses
and start-ups which face a high barrier to equity financing and a high level of operational or financial
uncertainty (and hence are prone to default).
The incentive to pay out dividends in presence of default risk is intuitive. A unit of wealth retained
in the firm can generate economic value via investment in the risky asset but it comes at the cost of the
potential loss when default arrives. Equity investors, however, can exploit the limited liability structure
of the entity by transferring some of the firm’s equity to their private pocket via dividends to earn a
mediocre but safe retail interest rate, rather than leaving all the money on the table just to be wiped out
(for example, to be seized by the creditors) when the firm goes bust.
The underlying optimization problem turns out to be a singular stochastic control problem. In contrast
to many other models of investment and dividend distribution, the optimal payout policy in our setup
is to pay dividends as to keep the ratio of the firm’s equity value to investors’ wealth level below a
certain critical threshold, rather than just to pay out the cash to keep the equity reserve below a constant
level. Moreover, the optimal leverage level is state-dependent with its magnitude being decreasing in the
equity-to-wealth ratio instead of being a constant.
Analysis of such a singular stochastic control problem is not straightforward in general and the concept
of viscosity solutions sometimes has to be invoked. Nonetheless, based on the transformation techniques
introduced in the recent work of Hobson and Zhu (2016) and Hobson et al. (2018), we show that the
associated HJB equation can indeed be reduced to a first order crossing problem. The critical dividend
payment boundary can be read from the point at which the solution to a first order differential equation
first crosses a given analytical function. An important advantage of this approach is that it is relatively
easy to deduce the comparative statics of the model. We find that a higher default risk leads to a lower
critical equity-to-wealth ratio for dividend payout, a higher leverage level and a lower consumption rate
of investors.
We close the introduction by relating our work to the existing literature. Both payout policy and
capital structure decision are long-standing research topics in corporate finance and it is impossible to
give a full account of the theory development here. Instead, we refer readers to the excellent surveys
by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Allen and Michaely (2003). Mainstream finance literature often studies
payout policy and capital structure decision separately but not their joint interaction, as highlighted by
Lambrecht and Myers (2012). The economic foundation of our model is based on Lambrecht and Myers
(2017) and Lambrecht and Tse (2018) where investment and payout policy are examined together in an
inter-temporal investment/consumption model. Although our exposition assumes perfect coordination
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between managers and investors, the same modeling framework can be directly applied to an agency
setup driven by utility maximization of self-interested risk averse managers (see Remark 2 in Section 2).
Continuous-time portfolio selection, which is the skeleton of the modeling framework in this paper, is
of course another enormous field in the mathematical finance and stochastic control literature. Existing
work usually focuses on optimal consumption/investment models as per the seminal work of Merton (1969,
1971) and its many other variants, or optimal risk control/dividend distribution models which are studied
extensively in the field of insurance [e.g. Radner and Shepp (1996), Browne (1997) and Jgaard and Taksar
(1999)]. In a certain sense, these two classes of models are equivalent because consumption and dividend
are usually viewed interchangeably, as stated by Taksar (2000) that optimal risk control/dividend models
in most instances are consumption/investment models with linear utility function and arithmetic Brownian
motion return. Implicitly, these models assume that payout from a firm has to be consumed immediately
and therefore discard the possibility that dividends can at least be deposited for consumption later. We
disentangle the effect of dividend payout and consumption by introducing a riskfree retail saving account
to investors as an outside option. One novel prediction as a result of this flexibility is that a bad firm will
be voluntarily liquidated because there is no longer the need to keep a bad firm alive just for the purpose
of generating dividends over time to match the smooth consumption required by risk averse investors. To
the best of our knowledge, our current paper is the first one to consider a joint, dynamic model of capital
structure (i.e. investment/risk control), dividend payout and individuals’ consumption.
We also examine the joint impact of default risk on the firms’ corporate policies and consumption
pattern of investors. Incorporation of exogenous default risk is not a new mathematical feature - optimal
portfolio choice and consumption problems with random termination time have been considered in life
insurance models [see for example Richard (1975) and Pliska and Ye (2007)]. In our current context of
corporate finance, nonetheless, consideration of default risk leads to some interesting economic phenomena
as revealed by the comparative statics.1
One important aspect of our model is that equity financing is not possible. Thus our model is
somewhat similar to a Merton problem with transaction costs as in Magill and Constantinides (1976),
Davis and Norman (1990) and Shreve and Soner (1994). More precisely, the special case studied by
Hobson and Zhu (2016), where transaction cost is zero on sale and infinite on purchase, is comparable to
our model in which equity capital can only be passed to investors as dividends but fresh capital cannot be
injected into the firm. Consequently, our optimal dividend strategy is similar to the investment strategy
obtained by Hobson and Zhu (2016). However, our model is inherently a higher dimensional one because
of the leverage decision involved and thus is not a trivial extension of their model. See the discussion
in Section 2. Broadly speaking, our work contributes to the growing literature on solving a singular
1The interaction among dividend, leverage and firm’s default is also explored in a one-period signaling model of Kucinskas
(2018), where high dividend is a bad signal for firms with high leverage because the payout can be driven by the motivation
of “cash out” prior to bankruptcy.
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stochastic control problem via reduction to a first order crossing problem [e.g. Hobson and Zhu (2016),
Hobson et al. (2018) and Hobson et al. (2016)]. It showcases the mathematical techniques are amendable
outside the context of portfolio selection under transaction costs and how powerful comparative statics
can be derived based on simple comparison principles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modeling setup. Section 3 gives
the main results of the paper and their economic significance. A heuristic derivation of the solution is
provided in Section 4 and we give a full verification argument of the candidate solution in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes. Some proofs in the main body of the paper are deferred to the appendix.
2. The setup
Throughout this paper we work with (Ω,F , {Ft},P) a filtered probability space satisfying the usual
conditions which supports a one-dimensional Brownian motion B = (Bt)t≥0.
A firm can invest in two classes of asset: a bond instrument with interest rate ρ, and a risky asset
which price process is a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ > 0. For every unit of
equity within the firm at time t, an amount of πt is invested in the risky asset whereas 1− πt is invested
in the bond. A choice of πt > 1 corresponds to a levered firm which borrows an amount of πt − 1 to
finance its investment in the risky asset. We call π = (πt)t≥0 an investment policy of the firm which
is required to be adapted and satisfy
∫ t
0
π2u(ω)du < ∞ for all (t, ω). Equity within the firm can also be
distributed to risk averse equity investors in form of dividends. Let Φ = (Φt)t≥0 with Φ0− = 0 be an
adapted, non-decreasing process representing the cumulative amount of dividends paid to the investors
up to time t. The equity value of the firm S = (St)t≥0 then evolves as
dSt = πtSt(µdt+ σdBt) + (1− πt)Stρdt− dΦt
= [ρ+ (µ− ρ)πt]Stdt+ σπtStdBt − dΦt. (1)
The risk averse investors have a logarithm utility function. They possess a private account which
earns a retail riskfree rate of r and they consume at the same time to derive utility flow continuously.
A consumption policy c = (ct)t≥0 is a non-negative, adapted process with
∫ t
0
cu(ω)du < ∞ for all (t, ω).
The investors’ wealth level X = (Xt)t≥0 then follows the dynamic
dXt = (rXt − ct)dt+ dΦt. (2)
The firm is exposed to a Poisson shock with intensity λ > 0 which causes the firm to default and wipes
out its equity entirely. Equity investors are protected by the limited liability structure of the entity and
their private wealth will remain intact. After the firm’s default, there is no other investment opportunity
available to the investors except their private saving account. Hence their optimal consumption strategy
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post-default can be derived by solving the deterministic control problem of
F (x) := sup
ct>0
∫ ∞
0
e−βt ln ctdt (3)
under the dynamic dXt = (rXt− ct)dt with X0 = x. Here β > 0 is the investors’ subjective discount rate.
The solution to (3) is known as
F (x) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
(4)
and the corresponding optimal consumption strategy is given by c∗t = βXt.
A collection of consumption, investment and dividend policies (c, π,Φ) is said to be admissible if St
and Xt are non-negative with (St, Xt) /∈ (0, 0) for all t ≥ 0. Denote by A(s, x) the class of admissible
strategies with initial value (S0− = s,X0− = x). Prior to default, equity investors’ expected discounted
liftime utility from consumption under a given (c, π,Φ) is
J(s, x; c, π,Φ) := E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βt ln ctdt
∣∣∣∣∣S0− = s,X0− = x
]
= E
[∫ τ
0
e−βt ln ctdt+
∫ ∞
τ
e−βt ln ctdt
∣∣∣∣∣S0− = s,X0− = x
]
where τ is an exponential random variable with parameter λ defined on the same probability space and
it is independent of the underlying Brownian motion B. Firm managers act in the best interest of the
investors. Their joint objective is to solve
V (s, x) := sup
(c,pi,Φ)∈A(s,x)
J(s, x; c, π,Φ)
which can be rewritten as
V (s, x) = sup
(c,pi,Φ)∈A(s,x)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−βt ln ctdt+ e
−βτF (Xτ )
∣∣∣∣∣S0− = s,X0− = x
]
(5)
due to dynamic programming principle [see Jeanblanc et al. (2004)].
Remark 1. It is straightforward to introduce a dividend tax rate of κ ∈ [0, 1) in the model such that
investors’ wealth process, prior to firm’s default, satisfies
dXt = (rXt − ct)dt+ (1− κ)dΦt (6)
instead. Then under the transformation X˜t :=
Xt
1−κ we can recover a version of the problem without tax.
Remark 2. The optimization problem (5) is a “first best” criteria where firm managers and investors can
perfectly coordinate to jointly deduce the optimal corporate policies and consumption strategy to create
maximum value for investors. It is indeed also possible to adopt our mathematical framework within
an agency-based model featuring self-interested, risk averse managers as in Lambrecht and Myers (2012,
2017). In this alternative setup, managers capture 1−κ fraction of the firm’s total payout as a form of rent
extraction and pass the remaining κ fraction to investors as dividends. We could interpret X = (Xt)t≥0
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in (6) and c = (ct)t≥0 as the private wealth level and consumption rate of the managers respectively.
The parameter 1 − κ now reflects the bargaining power of the managers.2 They simultaneously set the
corporate policies and their consumption strategy to maximize their own lifetime utility as in (5).
It is constructive to compare our modeling setup to that of Hobson and Zhu (2016) who consider a
Merton consumption and investment problem in which the risky asset can only be sold but not bought.
Our problem is similar to theirs in the sense that the transfer of value also occurs in one direction only
from the firm to the investors as dividends but capital cannot be injected into the firm from the investors.
In other words, we rule out the possibility of equity issuance within our setup. It is not an unreasonable
assumption as equity financing often involves expensive and time consuming procedures especially for
smaller firms.
In Hobson and Zhu (2016) wealth is allocated between a risky asset and a riskfree cash account as in
the standard Merton problem. Meanwhile, our model concerns wealth allocation between a risky firm
and a riskfree cash account where the value of the former is not an exogenously given process but rather
a controlled process based on the capital structure decision π. It is indeed possible to view our setup
as a variant of the Merton problem with transaction costs [as considered by Magill and Constantinides
(1976), Davis and Norman (1990) and Shreve and Soner (1994)], albeit with a very special transaction
costs structure. The economy features three distinct assets: a risky defaultable asset with drift µ and
volatility σ, a defaultable debt instrument with constant yield ρ and a non-defaultable cash account with
interest rate r. The two defaultable securities can only be sold for cash but not bought with cash, i.e.
transaction cost is infinite on purchase and zero on sale. However, these two securities are fully fungible
which can be freely converted from one into another at their prevailing value without any friction. This
unique transaction cost structure makes our problem non-trivial where the solution construction and the
related economic properties do not follow from the existing literature of portfolio optimization under
transaction costs.
3. Main results
We state the key results of this paper where the proof is deferred to Section 5.
Theorem 1. For the optimization problem (5):
(1) If µ = ρ ≤ λ+ r, the optimal strategy is to liquidate the firm immediately by distributing its entire
equity to investors in form of dividends and then investors consume their wealth at a rate of β.
The corresponding value function is given by
V (s, x) = F (s+ x) =
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
. (7)
2The sharing rule of the firm’s payout can be justified by solving a repeated bargaining game between managers and
investors. See Lambrecht and Myers (2012, 2017).
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(2) If µ 6= ρ or µ = ρ > λ + r, there exists a constant z∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that the optimal strategy
(prior to default of the firm) is not to pay any dividend when StXt ≤ z
∗. On this region, the optimal
consumption strategy and investment policy are given by the feedback controls c∗t = c
∗(St, Xt) and
π∗t = π
∗(St, Xt) where
c∗(s, x) :=
1
Vx(s, x)
, π∗(s, x) := −
(µ− ρ)Vs(s, x)
σ2sVss(s, x)
. (8)
V is the value function of the problem to be defined in Proposition 7 in Section 5. When StXt > z
∗,
the optimal strategy is to pay a discrete dividend of size St−z
∗Xt
1+z∗ to the investors and then the
strategies associated with the region of StXt ≤ z
∗ are followed thereafter.
Xt (Investors’ wealth)
St (Equity value of firm)
Zt :=
St
Xt
= z∗
no-dividend region
dividend paying region
Figure 1. A graphical illustration of the optimal dividend strategy. When the equity
value of the firm is too high or investors’ private wealth is too low such that St/Xt > z
∗,
a discrete amount of dividend is paid out by the firm to bring the ratio St/Xt back to
z∗. No dividend is paid when the state variables lie within the no-dividend region.
In our model, there are two economic motives for the equity investors to invest in the firm. The first
motive is brought by the investment prospect of the firm which exists for as long as the excess return of
the risky asset µ − ρ is non-zero. Note that investors are still willing to invest in the firm even if µ < ρ
because it is possible for the firm to short sell the poor performing risky asset for value creation. The
second motive lies within the funding advantage of the firm due to its access to corporate debt financing.
At minimum, the firm can serve as a “risky bank account” with yield ρ and default rate λ. This funding
vehicle is superior to the investors’ private saving account provided that the default-risk-adjusted yield
ρ − λ is larger than the retail saving rate r. For the parameter combination in part (1) of Theorem 1,
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there is neither investment nor funding motive to invest in the firm and hence the optimal strategy is to
liquidate the firm immediately.
This very plausible prediction that a bad firm will be immediately liquidated is a unique feature
relative to other models based on the standard Merton investment/consumption framework (such as
Lambrecht and Myers (2017)). Under risk aversion, individuals demand a smooth consumption schedule.
If dividends are tied with consumption, then risk aversion will force dividends to be smooth as well
and hence a bad firm must be run continuously to generate cash flows over time. By distinguishing
consumption and dividend via the possibility of depositing investors’ private wealth in a retail account,
individuals can opt to liquidate a bad firm and consume the proceeds over time optimally according to
their own preference.
For the more general parameter combination in part (2) of Theorem 1, the optimal dividend strategy
resembles the optimal investment strategy of a Merton problem with infinite transaction costs as in
Hobson and Zhu (2016). Rigorously speaking, the optimal dividend strategy Φ∗ is a local time policy
which keeps Zt :=
St
Xt
≤ z∗, and it can be characterized by the solution to a Skorohod equation with
reflecting boundary along Zt = z
∗. Dividends are paid when the firm value is too high or investors’
private wealth level is too low in order to keep ratio of firm value to private wealth below a threshold.
See Figure 1. In particular, the payout trigger target is given by St ≤ z
∗Xt where the right hand side
is not a constant [as commonly seen in standard dividend distribution models such as Radner and Shepp
(1996)] but instead it increases with the investors’ private wealth. As investors become more wealthy,
consumption can be adequately supported from their private account and hence a larger fraction of equity
can be retained within the firm to further finance its investment activities. It is another unique feature
of our model due to the disentanglement of dividend payout and consumption.
Remark 3. In the context of corporate finance, it might be more sensible to impose the constraint π > 0
since there may not exist a realistic way for a firm to dis-invest in a project. This can be incorporated
within our model, and Theorem 1 will then remain the same except that the conditions for case (1) and
(2) shall be replaced by “µ ≤ ρ ≤ λ+ r” and “µ > ρ, or µ ≤ ρ and ρ > λ+ r” respectively.
Although the characterization of the optimal controls in Theorem 1 is somewhat abstract under the
non-degenerate case (2), a lower bound of z∗ is available and the monotonicity of π∗ and c∗ with respect
to the state variables can be established. Moreover, in the corner case of µ = ρ > λ + r the closed-form
expressions of the optimal controls can indeed be derived. The results are summarized in the following
two propositions which proofs are given in Appendix 7.2.
Proposition 1. Suppose µ 6= ρ and consider the optimal controls defined in case (2) of Theorem 1:
(1) The critical threshold of dividend payment z∗ satisfies (ρ−r−λ)
+
λ ≤ z
∗ <∞.
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(2) The optimal investment level π∗(s, x) admits an expression π∗(s, x) = µ−ρσ2 θ(s/x) where θ(z) is a
bounded, positive and decreasing function on 0 < z ≤ z∗ with θ(z∗) > 1.
(3) The optimal consumption rate per unit private wealth c¯(s, x) := c
∗(s,x)
x is a function of z =
s
x only
which is increasing on 0 < z ≤ z∗ and c¯(z) ↓ β as z ↓ 0.
Proposition 2. Suppose µ = ρ > λ+ r and consider the optimal controls defined in case (2) of Theorem
1. Then
z∗ =
ρ− r − λ
λ
, π∗(s, x) = 0, c∗(s, x) =
x
1/β − q(s/x)
where q = q(z) is an implicit function defined as the solution to
z =
(
ρ− r − λ
λ
) λ
β+λ
(
ρ− r − λ
β(ρ− r)
)− ρ−r
β+λ
(
βq
1− βq
) β
β+λ
q
ρ−r
β+λ . (9)
Analytical expressions of all the important control variables are available in the case of µ = ρ > λ+ r
where the investment motive vanishes.3 The firm essentially becomes a pure funding vehicle (subject to
default risk) without any investment in the risky asset as π∗ = 0. The optimal dividend policy is then
entirely driven by the funding quality of the firm measured by ρ−rλ , which can be interpreted as the
corporate yield spread per unit default risk. Higher this ratio, less often the firm pays dividends since it
is more efficient to retain the capital within the firm for value creation.
In the more general case of µ 6= ρ, part (1) of Proposition 1 implies that z∗ ↑ ∞ as λ ↓ 0 provided
that ρ > r. The economic interpretation of this limiting result is the following: as long as the funding
advantage ρ > r exists, it is in general suboptimal to pay out any dividend because a unit of wealth in
the investors’ private account can only earn the retail rate r whereas a unit of equity within the firm can
at least earn a better rate ρ when default of firm is not a concern. Dividends should thus only be paid out
after investors’ private wealth has been entirely depleted. Once X hits zero, the firm pays out dividend
continuously to match the optimal consumption required by the investors. Although we do not explicitly
consider λ = 0 in this paper, the optimal strategy of this special case can be characterized rigorously
similar to Theorem 10 of Hobson and Zhu (2016).
The magnitude of the firm’s investment level is decreasing in equity value St and increasing in investors’
wealth Xt. To understand this behavior, it is important to note that investors’ exposure to the risky asset
is determined by two factors: the fraction of wealth invested in the firm Zt = St/Xt and the investment
level of the firm πt. In general, risk averse investors desire to maintain a target exposure to the risky
asset. A benchmark example is that if there is no friction in the economy such that investors do not
need to rely on the firm as an intermediary to invest in the risky asset, then they will invest a constant
3Note that the case of µ = ρ ≤ λ+ r has been covered by case (1) of Theorem 1 where we can take z∗ = 0 corresponding
to immediate liquidation.
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fraction of their wealth in the risky asset given by the Merton ratio. In our model where equity financing
cannot be performed freely, the firm thus has to be leveraged more aggressively when equity value declines
or investors’ wealth increases to provide an efficient risk-return exposure for the investors. Notice that
θ(z∗) > 1 implies the investment level is always larger than the Merton ratio (in magnitude).
Consumption rate rises as the state variable Zt = St/Xt approaches the critical threshold z
∗ because
investors anticipate a dividend payment is due soon which will boost their wealth level and hence a larger
consumption today becomes sustainable.
The next proposition highlights the key comparative statics of our model. The proof can be found in
Appendix 7.3.
Proposition 3. Suppose we are in the non-degenerate case of either µ 6= ρ or µ = ρ > λ+ r. Then the
following comparative statics hold:
(1) The critical threshold of dividend payment z∗ is decreasing in λ, r and σ, and is increasing (resp.
decreasing) in µ when µ ≥ ρ (resp. µ ≤ ρ).
(2) The optimal investment level π∗(s, x) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in λ and r when µ > ρ
(resp. µ < ρ).
(3) The optimal consumption level c∗(s, x) is decreasing in λ and r.
We focus on the comparative statics results with respect to λ (see Figure 2 for some numerical illustra-
tions). Firstly, with a higher default risk λ the firm pays out dividends more aggressively as reflected by
a lower critical threshold z∗. This can be understood as a phenomenon of moral hazard. When managers
foresee that their firm is more likely to fail, there is a stronger precautionary incentive to transfer value
within the firm to the investors’ in form of dividends because the wealth in the private pocket of investors
is left untouched due to limited liability while equity within the firm is seized or wiped out in the event
of default.
Among all the results in Proposition 3, perhaps the most surprising one is that the magnitude of π∗
is increasing in λ. This may seem counter-intuitive in view of the risk averse nature of equity investors
as the result here suggests the (absolute) investment level is higher for a riskier firm (in terms of default
risk). Nonetheless, this result should be understood in conjunction with the impact of λ on z∗. A higher
λ leads to a lower dividend threshold z∗ and as such a smaller pool of equity (relative to investors’ wealth)
is retained in the firm on average. To offset this effect of under-investment, the firm has be leveraged
more aggressively to restore the overall exposure to the risky asset.
Finally, the effect of λ on the optimal consumption is intuitive where a higher default risk of the firm
encourages precautionary saving of the investors by reducing consumption.
The above results could be of interests to the area of corporate finance because they suggest aggressive
payout policy and capital structure could potentially be driven by a high level of default risk where equity
holders exploit the limited liability structure of the firm to retain value for themselves, thus a symptom of
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(a) Dividend payment boundary.
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(b) Optimal investment level.
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
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c
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s,
x)
/x
λ=0.03
λ=0.05
λ=0.07
(c) Optimal consumption.
Figure 2. Comparative statics of the optimal controls with respect to λ. Base parame-
ters used are: µ = 0.2, σ = 0.3, ρ = 0.1, r = 0.02 and β = 0.1.
moral hazard. An important caveat behind the above interpretations is that we assume both µ and ρ are
fixed constants independent of λ. Implicitly, we assume asymmetric information between equity holders
and bondholders. Only the former know the firm is subject to a Poisson default shock of intensity λ while
the latter do not take this default possibility into account when setting the debt yield. On the other hand,
the default risk is assumed to be an idiosyncratic one which does not improve the risky asset return µ. In
a bank lending model of Lambrecht and Tse (2018), both ρ and µ are linked to λ depending on how an
insolvent bank is resolved during an economic downturn. In general, we could incorporate extensions of
this kind by replacing ρ and µ by some functions of λ. This will not significantly change the mathematical
analysis of the stochastic control problem. However, the comparative statics with respect to λ will now
depend on the precise constructions of ρ(λ) and µ(λ).
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4. A heuristic derivation of the solution
In this section we use heuristics to derive an equation that the value function should satisfy. Its
optimality is then verified rigorously in Section 5.
It is convenient to reformulate (5) as an infinite horizon control problem. Note that
E
[∫ τ
0
e−βt ln ctdt+ e
−βτF (Xτ )
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
1(τ>t)e
−βt ln ctdt
]
+ E
[
e−βτF (Xτ )
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−(β+λ)t ln ctdt
]
+
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtE
[
e−βtF (Xt)
]
dt
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−(β+λ)t (ln ct + λF (Xt)) dt
]
where we have used the fact that τ is an independent exponential random variable. Hence problem (5) is
equivalent to
V (s, x) = sup
(c,pi,Φ)∈A(s,x)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−(β+λ)t (ln ct + λF (Xt)) dt
∣∣∣∣∣S0− = s,X0− = x
]
(10)
which is an infinite horizon problem with discount rate β + λ and running reward ln ct + λF (Xt).
Write
Mt :=
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)u[ln cu + λF (Xu)]du+ e
−(β+λ)tV (St, Xt).
Then we expect M is a supermartingale in general, and is a true martingale under the optimal strategy.
Suppose V is a C2×1 function, applying Ito’s lemma we find
e(β+λ)tdMt =
{
ln ct − Vxct + rVxXt + ρVsSt + (µ− ρ)VsStπt +
σ2
2
VssS
2
t π
2
t − (β + λ)Vt + λF (Xt)
}
dt
+ (Vx − Vs)dΦt + σπtVsStdBt.
Further assume Vx > 0 and Vss < 0, the drift term can be maximized with respect to c and π. Then we
expect the value function to solve the HJB variational inequality
min (−LV,−MV ) = 0 (11)
where the operators L and M are defined as
Lf := sup
c>0,pi
{
ln c− fxc+ rfxx+ ρfss+ (µ− ρ)fssπ +
σ2
2
fsss
2π2 − (β + λ)f + λF (x)
}
= − ln fx − 1 + rfxx+ ρfss−
(µ− ρ)2[fs]
2
2σ2fss
− (β + λ)f + λF (x), (12)
Mf := fx − fs. (13)
Inspired by Magill and Constantinides (1976), we conjecture the optimal strategy is to pay dividends
only when the ratio Zt :=
St
Xt
is above a certain threshold z∗ (refer to Figure 1 again). Following
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Davis and Norman (1990), we postulate the value function has the form
V (s, x) =
1
β
lnx+ g
( s
x
)
(14)
for some function g to be determined. Write z := sx . Then over z ≤ z
∗ no dividend is paid and we expect
LV = 0 which becomes
− ln
(
1
β
− zg′(z)
)
+ (ρ− r)zg′(z)−
(µ− ρ)2[g′(z)]2
2σ2g′′(z)
− (β + λ)g(z) +
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1 = 0.
(15)
The system can be further simplified by a series of transformation used in Hobson and Zhu (2016) and
Hobson et al. (2018). Write u := ln z and let h(u) = h(ln z) := g(z) − 1β+λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β + lnβ − 1
)
+ rβ − 1
]
.
Then
g′(z) =
d
dz
g(z) =
d
dz
h(u) =
d
du
h(u)
du
dz
=
h′(u)
z
,
g′′(z) =
d
dz
h′(u)
z
=
1
z
d
dz
h′(u)−
h′(u)
z2
=
h′′(u)
z2
−
h′(u)
z2
.
(15) can then be reduced to
− ln
(
1
β
− h′(u)
)
+ (ρ− r)h′(u)−
(µ− ρ)2[h′(u)]2
2σ2(h′′(u)− h′(u))
− (β + λ)h(u) = 0. (16)
Set w(h) := dhdu such that h
′′(u) = dduw(h) = w
′(h)h′(u) = w′(h)w(h). (16) then becomes
− ln
(
1
β
− w(h)
)
+ (ρ− r)w(h) −
(µ− ρ)2w(h)
2σ2(w′(h)− 1)
− (β + λ)h = 0. (17)
Let N be the inverse function of w, i.e. N := w−1, and write q := w(h). (17) can then be written as
− ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+ (ρ− r)q −
(µ− ρ)2q
2σ2(1/N ′(q)− 1)
− (β + λ)N(q) = 0. (18)
Suppose for now µ 6= ρ. The special case of µ = ρ is discussed at the end of this section. Set
n(q) := ln
(
1
β − q
)
+ βN(q). After some algebra of substituting N and N ′ away by n and n′ in (18), we
can obtain a first order ODE n′(q) = O(q, n(q)) where
O(q, n) :=
β2q
1− βq
m(q)− n
n− ℓ(q)
(19)
and
m(q) :=
β
β + λ
{
(ρ− r)q +
λ
β
ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2β
}
,
ℓ(q) :=
β
β + λ
{[
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
]
q +
λ
β
ln
(
1
β
− q
)}
= m(q)−
β
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
(
1
β
− q
)
.
We now derive the form of the value function on the dividend paying regime sx = z > z
∗. Under
the conjectured strategy, a lump sum dividend D is paid out by the firm to restore the equity value to
investors’ private wealth ratio back to z∗. D should then solve s−Dx+D = z
∗ which gives D = s−z
∗x
1+z∗ . The
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value function does not change on this corporate action and thus V (s − D, x + D) = V (s, x) which is
equivalent to
1
β
ln(x+D) + g(z∗) =
1
β
lnx+ g(z).
From this we obtain
g(z) =
1
β
ln
(
1 +
D
x
)
+ g(z∗) =
1
β
ln
(
1 + z
1 + z∗
)
+ g(z∗) =
1
β
ln(1 + z) +A∗ (20)
on z > z∗ where A∗ is some constant.
Now we apply the same set of transformations to (20). We have
h(u) = g(eu)−
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
=
1
β
ln(1 + eu) +A∗ −
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
=:
1
β
ln(1 + eu) + A¯.
Then
w(h) = h′(u) =
1
β
eu
1 + eu
=
1
β
eβ(h−A¯) − 1
eβ(h−A¯)
=
1
β
(1− eβ(A¯−h))
and the inverse function of w is found to be
N(q) = w−1(q) = A¯−
1
β
(
lnβ + ln
(
1
β
− q
))
.
Finally,
n(q) = ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+ βN(q) = βA¯− lnβ = βA∗ −
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
λ
λ+ β
ln
1
β
= βA∗ −
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+ ℓ(0) (21)
which is a constant. The above relationships hold as long as z > z∗, on which
q = w(h) =
1
β
eu
1 + eu
=
1
β
z
1 + z
.
Hence the equivalent range in the q-coordinate is q > q∗ := 1β
z∗
1+z∗ .
We expect the transformed value function n to solve n′ = O(q, n) on q ≤ q∗ and to be a constant on
q > q∗. To solve such a free boundary value problem, we further require an initial value associated with
the system. Along the boundary s = 0 the equity value of the firm is zero and hence cannot invest in
the risky asset nor the bond (if a firm with zero net equity attempts to borrow to invest or short sell the
asset to support purchase of the bond, the Brownian nature of the asset price will make it impossible for
the firm to maintain non-negative equity value). Then essentially the firm ceases to exist and the only
feasible strategy is for the investors to consume their existing private wealth optimally. Hence V (0, x) =
F (x) = 1β lnx +
1
β
[
r
β + lnβ − 1
]
. This boundary condition translates into g(0) = 1β
[
r
β + lnβ − 1
]
,
h(−∞) = g(0) − 1β+λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β + lnβ − 1
)
+ rβ − 1
]
= ln ββ+λ and we expect h
′(−∞) = 0. Then w
(
ln β
β+λ
)
=
w(h(−∞)) = h′(−∞) = 0, N(0) = ln ββ+λ . and finally n(0) = ln
1
β +
β
β+λ lnβ =
λ
β+λ ln
1
β = ℓ(0).
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In summary, we are looking for a solution n with initial value n(0) = ℓ(0) which solves n′ = O(q, n) on
0 ≤ q ≤ q∗ and n(q) being a constant on q > q∗, where q∗ is an unknown boundary to be identified. The
conjectured second order smoothness of the original value function V now translates into the first order
smoothness of n and as such we expect n′(q∗) = 0. But the form of (19) suggests that, away from q = 0,
n′ = O(q, n) = 0 if and only if n = m. Hence the boundary point q∗ must be given by the q-coordinate
where the solution n intersects the function m(q).
The next proposition confirms that a solution n and the corresponding free boundary point q∗ indeed
exist.
Proposition 4. Suppose µ 6= ρ. Consider an initial value problem
n′(q) = O(q, n(q)) :=
β2q
1− βq
m(q)− n(q)
n(q)− ℓ(q)
, n(0) = ℓ(0) and n′(0) > ℓ′(0)
where
m(q) :=
β
β + λ
{
(ρ− r)q +
λ
β
ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2β
}
,
ℓ(q) :=
β
β + λ
{[
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
]
q +
λ
β
ln
(
1
β
− q
)}
.
A unique solution to the above problem exists at least up to 0 ≤ q ≤ q∗ with n′(0) > 0 and q∗ := inf{q >
0 : n(q) ≥ m(q)} ∈ ( 1β
(ρ−r−λ)+
(ρ−r−λ)++λ ,
1
β ). The solution n is strictly increasing and lies between ℓ(q) and m(q)
on (0, q∗).
Proof. We first show that a unique solution exists in the neighborhood of q = 0. Let χ(q) := n(q)− ℓ(q).
Then the initial value problem is equivalent to
χ′(q) = n′(q)− ℓ′(q) = O(q, χ(q) + ℓ(q))− ℓ′(q)
=
β2
1− βq
[
β
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
(
1
β
− q
)
− χ(q)
]
q
χ(q)
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
−
λ
1− βq
)
=: A(q, χ(q))
q
χ(q)
+B(q) :=: Oˆ(q, χ(q)) (22)
subject to χ(0) = 0 and χ′(0) > 0.
Consider first a simpler problem in form of
χ′(q) = A
q
χ(q)
+B, χ(0) = 0 and χ′(0) > 0
where A,B are constants with A > 0. Making use of the substitution y = χq , we can obtain an ODE in
terms of y = y(q) as y + q dydq =
A
y +B and in turn
y
A+By − y2
dy =
1
q
dq. (23)
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Since A > 0, the denominator on the left hand side of (23) admits an expression of (α−y)(γ+y) for some
α, γ > 0. (23) can then be solved via partial fraction which leads to the solution of |q|α+γ |α−y|α|γ+y|γ =
C for some arbitrary constant C, or equivalently
|αq − χ|α|γq + χ|γ = C.
The initial condition χ(0) = 0 forces C = 0. Hence the solution is either χ(q) = αq or χ(q) = −γq where
the former satisfies the initial condition χ′(0) > 0.
Return to the original problem (22), as A(0, 0) = β
2
β+λ
(µ−ρ)2
2σ2 > 0 a small extension to the above
argument shows that a unique solution to problem (22) exists satisfying limq↓0
χ(q)
q = α where α is the
positive root to the quadratic equation
A(0, 0) +B(0)y − y2 = 0. (24)
The conclusion that n′(0) > 0 is now clear since an application of L’Hopital’s rule to n′(q) = O(q, n(q))
around q = 0 gives
n′(0) =
β2[m(0)− ℓ(0)]
n′(0)− ℓ′(0)
=
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
1
n′(0)− ℓ′(0)
and thus n′(0) > ℓ′(0) implies n′(0) > 0.
Away from the singular initial point (0, 0), the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the ODE are
guaranteed by standard theories. Since n′(0) > ℓ′(0) and n(0) = ℓ(0) < m(0), n is initially lying between
ℓ(q) andm(q). It is trivial from the form of O(q, n) that the solution n cannot cross ℓ, and that the solution
is increasing for as long as q < 1β and n(q) stays between m(q) and ℓ(q). As m(q) → −∞ when q →
1
β ,
n must cross m somewhere on q < 1β which guarantees the existence of q
∗ := inf{q > 0 : n(q) ≥ m(q)}.
Moreover, as n(q) < m(q) on q < q∗ and the derivative of n has to be zero when n crosses m, we must
have m′(q∗) ≤ 0. A simple calculus exercise shows that m(q) has an inverted U-shape when ρ− r−λ > 0
with its maximum attained at q = ρ−r−λβ(ρ−r) and thus q
∗ ≥ ρ−r−λβ(ρ−r) . Otherwise if ρ− r − λ ≤ 0 then m(q) is
decreasing for all 0 ≤ q < 1/β and in this case we can only conclude q∗ > 0. Combining these two cases
leads to q∗ ∈ ( 1β
(ρ−r−λ)+
(ρ−r−λ)++λ ,
1
β ).

Remark 4. Note that we have imposed an additional constraint of n′(0) > ℓ′(0) in Proposition 4. If we
instead pick the solution with n′(0) < ℓ′(0), then n(q) will be initially below ℓ(q). The form of O suggests
that n is decreasing and does not cross ℓ, and in turn m, for all q. Then there does not exist a boundary
point q∗ at which smooth pasting holds. The resulting n therefore is not a sensible candidate solution.
Finally, we consider the special case of µ = ρ. We can indeed obtain an explicit solution for n where
(18) gives a closed-form expression of N as
N(q) =
1
β + λ
[
(ρ− r)q − ln
(
1
β
− q
)]
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and thus
n(q) = ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+ βN(q) =
β
β + λ
[
(ρ− r)q +
λ
β
ln
(
1
β
− q
)]
= m(q) = ℓ(q).
This result should not be surprising. From Proposition 4, ℓ(q) < n(q) < m(q) on 0 < q < q∗ and
m(q)− ℓ(q)→ 0 as µ→ ρ, we must have n(q)→ m(q) = ℓ(q) when µ approaches ρ.
What should be the correct value of q∗ when µ = ρ? Again, we expect n is a constant on q > q∗ and
first order smoothness suggests q∗ should satisfy n′(q∗) = m′(q∗) = 0. Thus q∗ should be the q-coordinate
of the turning point of m(q) if it exists. The existence condition is given by m′(0) > 0 which is equivalent
to ρ− r − λ > 0 and the corresponding value of q∗ is ρ−r−λβ(ρ−r) .
If ρ−r−λ ≤ 0, then one cannot locate any positive boundary point at which the first order smoothness
holds. Our conjecture in this case is that the no-dividend region vanishes which is economically equivalent
to q∗ = 0. The firm is liquidated immediately at time zero and investors receive the entire equity of the
firm as dividends. The value function should thus satisfy
V (s, x) = F (s+ x) =
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
=
1
β
lnx+
1
β
ln(1 + z) +
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
and thus g(z) = 1β ln(1 + z) +
1
β
[
r
β + lnβ − 1
]
. If we apply the transformation which takes (20) to (21),
we can obtain n(q) = λλ+β ln
1
β = m(0) = ℓ(0) for all q ≥ 0.
To summarize this section, all possible shapes of n, m and ℓ under different parameter combinations
are shown in Figure 2.
5. Construction of the candidate value function and verification
The heuristics in Section 4 guide us to write down a first order system that the transformed value
function should satisfy (with closed-form expressions available in some special cases). Conversely, given
the solution to the first order system we can reverse the transformation to construct a second order smooth
candidate value function and prove its optimality via a formal verification argument.
We first construct the candidate value function in the special case of µ = ρ ≤ r + λ in which case we
expect the optimal strategy is to liquidate the firm immediately by transferring all equity to investors via
dividends payment.
Proposition 5. Suppose µ = ρ ≤ r + λ. On (s, x) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} define
V C(s, x) =
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
. (25)
Then V C(s, x) is a concave function increasing in both s and x. Moreover, LV C ≤ 0 and MV C = 0,
where L and M are the operators defined in (12) and (13).
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(a) µ 6= ρ and ρ > r + λ.
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(b) µ 6= ρ and ρ ≤ r + λ.
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(c) µ = ρ > r + λ.
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Figure 3. The possible shapes of the transformed value function n under different pa-
rameter combinations. When µ 6= ρ, n is first increasing and then becomes flat when it
crosses m at q = q∗. When µ = ρ, n, m and ℓ coincide and q∗ is the turning point of m
if exists. If µ = ρ ≤ r+ λ such that m is decreasing for all q ≥ 0, we take q∗ = 0 and the
transformed value function is a flat horizontal line n(q) = m(0) = ℓ(0).
Proof. It is trivial that V C is concave and is increasing in both of its arguments. Direct computation
gives V Cs = V
C
x =
1
β(s+x) and in turn MV
C = 0. Finally,
LV C = − ln
1
β(s+ x)
− 1 +
r
β
x
s+ x
+
ρ
β
s
s+ x
− (β + λ)
[
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)]
+ λ
[
1
β
lnx+
1
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)]
=
λ
β
ln
x
s+ x
+
ρ− r
β
s
s+ x
≤
λ
β
ln
x
s+ x
+
λ
β
s
s+ x
=
λ
β
(
ln
x
s+ x
+ 1−
x
s+ x
)
.
Simple calculus exercise shows that f(α) := lnα+ 1− α ≤ 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1) and hence LV C ≤ 0. 
Away from the special case of µ = ρ ≤ r + λ, we cannot write down the candidate value function
explicitly. In the following two propositions, we describe how the transformation introduced in Section 4
can be reversed and several important analytical properties of the constructed candidate value function
are provided.
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Proposition 6. If µ 6= ρ, let n = (n(q))0≤q≤q∗ be the solution to the initial value problem in Proposition
4 where q∗ := inf{q > 0 : n(q) ≥ m(q)}. Otherwise if µ = ρ > r + λ, define n(q) := m(q) on 0 ≤ q ≤
q∗ := ρ−r−λβ(ρ−r) .
In both case, let z∗ := βq
∗
1−βq∗ and N(q) :=
1
β
[
n(q)− ln
(
1
β − q
)]
. Let w be the inverse function of N .
For −∞ < u ≤ ln z∗, define h = h(u) as the solution to
∫ N(q∗)
h
dv
w(v)
= ln z∗ − u (26)
which is equivalent to
∫ q∗
w(h)
N ′(v)
v
dv = ln z∗ − u. (27)
u→ h(u) is then a strictly increasing bijection from (−∞, ln z∗]→ (N(0), N(q∗)].
Finally, set
gC(z) :=


h(ln z) + 1β+λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β + lnβ − 1
)
+ rβ − 1
]
, 0 < z ≤ z∗;
1
β ln(1 + z) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β + lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
, z > z∗.
(28)
Then gC : (0,∞)→ R is a C2 function.
Proof. For ease of notation we suppress the superscript C in gC throughout the proof. We give the proof
in the case of µ 6= ρ. It is much easier to establish the results under µ = ρ since n and q∗ are then available
in closed-form.
We first show that h(u) is an increasing bijection. Recall from Proposition 4 that n is increasing. Then
N ′(v) = n
′(v)
β +
1
1−βv > 0 on v <
1
β and in turn the integrand on the left hand side of (27) is strictly
positive such that w(h(u)) is strictly increasing in u. Moreover,
∫ ·
0+
N ′(v)
v
dv >
∫ ·
0+
dv
v(1− βv)
= +∞.
Hence u → w(h(u)) is a bijection from (−∞, ln z∗] to (0, q∗]. Since N = w−1 is strictly increasing on
(0, q∗], u→ h(u) is a bijection from (−∞, ln z∗]→ (N(0), N(q∗)].
Now we proceed to show that g is a C2 function. On z > z∗, g is trivially a C2 function. On 0 < z < z∗,
n is a C1 function and the continuity property is inherited by (N,N ′) and then on integration by (h, h′, h′′)
and finally (g, g′, g′′). It is thus sufficient to check the continuity of g, g′ and g′′ at z = z∗ > 0.
From (26), h(ln z∗) = N(q∗) = 1β
[
n(q∗)− ln
(
1
β − q
∗
)]
= n(q
∗)
β −
1
β ln
(
1
β(1+z∗)
)
. Hence
g(z∗) = h(ln z∗) +
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
=
1
β
ln(1 + z∗) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
= g(z∗+).
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We now check the continuity of zg′(z) at z = z∗. Let u∗ := ln z∗ and h∗ := h(u∗). Then by construction,
z∗g′(z∗) = h′(u∗) = w(h∗) = q∗. Meanwhile, (z∗+)g′(z∗+) = z
∗
β(1+z∗) = q
∗. This implies the continuity
of g′ at z∗.
Similarly we check the continuity of z2g′′(z) at z = z∗. From construction we can deduce
(z∗)2g′′(z∗) = h′′(u∗)− h′(u∗) = w(h∗)[w′(h∗)− 1] = q∗
(
1
N ′(q∗)
− 1
)
= −β(q∗)2
where we have used the fact N ′(q) = 1β
(
n′(q) + β1−βq
)
and n′(q∗) = 0. On the other hand,
(z∗+)2g′′(z∗+) = −
(z∗)2
β(1 + z∗)2
= −β(q∗)2.
This completes the proof. 
When we transform the original HJB equation in Section 4, a crucial step is a change of the independent
variable via q := w(h) which leads to the transformed value function n = (n(q))0≤q≤q∗ . Proposition 6
is about the reversal of the transformation. While q is a dummy independent variable associated with
the candidate value function n in the transformed system, one should keep in mind that q is related
to the original coordinate system through q := w[h(u)] = w[h(ln z)]. The following lemma provides an
important link between the two coordinate systems which will be utilized extensively in many of the
subsequent proofs in this paper.
Lemma 1. Recall the notations introduced in Proposition 6. Write q := w[h(u)] = w[h(ln z)]. Then z
and q are linked via
z = z(q) =
βq
1− βq
exp
(
−
∫ q∗
q
n′(v)
βv
dv
)
. (29)
In particular, z : [0, q∗] → [0, z∗] is an strictly increasing function, z(q) ↓ 0 as q ↓ 0 and z(q) ↑ z∗ as
q ↑ q∗.
Proof. Starting from (27),
ln z∗ − ln z =
∫ q∗
q
N ′(v)
v
dv =
∫ q∗
q
(
n′(v)
βv
+
1
v(1 − βv)
)
dv
=
∫ q∗
q
(
n′(v)
βv
)
dv + ln
q∗
1− βq∗
− ln
q
1− βq
=
∫ q∗
q
(
n′(v)
βv
)
dv + ln z∗ − ln
βq
1− βq
and we can arrive at (29) after a slight rearrangement of the terms. Since n′(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, q∗],
z = z(q) is increasing in q.
DIVIDEND POLICY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A DEFAULTABLE FIRM 21
From the form of (29) it is trivial that z ↑ z∗ as q ↑ q∗ because n′(v)/v is bounded near v = q∗. To
establish z(q) ↓ 0 as q ↓ 0, observe that
0 ≤ z(q) =
βq
1− βq
exp
(
−
∫ q∗
q
n′(v)
βv
dv
)
≤
βq
1− βq
.
Taking limit gives the desired result.

Now we formally define the candidate value function in the non-degenerate case and provide a few
useful properties.
Proposition 7. For µ 6= ρ or µ = ρ > r + λ, define
V C(s, x) =
1
β
lnx+ gC
( s
x
)
, s > 0, x > 0 (30)
where gC is defined in Proposition 6. Then:
(1) V C can be extended to s = 0 and x = 0 by continuity leading to
V C(0, x) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
, x > 0,
V C(s, 0) =
1
β
ln s+
1
β
[
m(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
, s > 0.
(2) V C(s, x) is a concave function and is increasing in both s and x.
(3) On {(s, x) : s > xz∗, s ≥ 0, x ≥ 0}, MV C = 0 and LV C ≤ 0.
(4) On {(s, x) : 0 ≤ s ≤ xz∗, x ≥ 0, sx 6= 0}, LV C = 0; On {(s, x) : 0 < s ≤ xz∗, x ≥ 0}, MV C ≤ 0.
Proof. Again we will suppress the superscript C in gC throughout the proof for brevity.
(1) Recall that u→ h(u) is a bijection from (−∞, ln z∗] to (N(0), N(q∗)]. Then
lim
z↓0
g(z) = lim
u↓−∞
h(u) +
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
= N(0) +
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
=
1
β
[
ℓ(0)− ln
1
β
]
+
1
β + λ
[
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
+
r
β
− 1
]
=
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
.
Thus
V C(0, x) := lim
s↓0
V C(s, x) =
1
β
lnx+ lim
z↓0
g(z) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
.
On the other hand, for all x 6= 0 and sx = z > z
∗ we have
V C(s, x) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β
ln(1 + s/x) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
=
1
β
ln(x+ s) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
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and hence
V C(s, 0) := lim
x↓0
V C(s, x) =
1
β
ln s+
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
since z∗ <∞.
(2) On s > xz∗,
V C(s, x) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β
ln(1 + s/x) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
=
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]
which is obviously a concave function increasing in both s and x. On s ≤ xz∗ or equivalently
q ≤ q∗,
V Cx =
1
x
(
1
β
− zg′(z)
)
=
1
x
(
1
β
− h′(u)
)
=
1
x
(
1
β
− w(h)
)
≥
1
x
(
1
β
− q∗
)
> 0
as q∗ < 1/β from Proposition 4, and
V Cs =
1
x
g′(z) =
1
s
zg′(z) =
1
s
h′(u) =
1
s
w(h) > 0.
Since g is second-order smooth at z = z∗ by Proposition 6, to show that V C concave it is sufficient
to check that the Hessian matrix
H :=

V Css V Csx
V Cxs V
C
xx


is semi-negative definite on s ≤ xz∗. From the transformation adopted,
Vss =
g′′(z)
x2
=
1
s2
z2g′′(z) =
1
s2
[h′′ − h′] =
w(h)
s2
[w′(h)− 1] =
q
s2
[1/N ′(q)− 1] < 0
as
N ′(q) =
n′(q)
β
+
1
1− βq
≥
1
1− βq
> 1 (31)
given n is increasing. Meanwhile, the determinant of H can be evaluated as
V CssV
C
xx − [V
C
xs]
2 =
1
x2
[
g′′(z)
(
z2g′′(z) + 2zg′(z)−
1
β
)
− (g′(z) + zg′′(z))2
]
= −
1
x4
[
g′′(z)
β
+ (g′(z))2
]
= −
1
z2x4
[
z2g′′(z)
β
+ (zg′(z))2
]
= −
1
z2x4
[
h′′ − h′
β
+ (h′)2
]
= −
w(h)
z2x4
[
w′(h)− 1
β
+ w(h)
]
= −
q
z2x4
[
1/N ′(q)− 1
β
+ q
]
.
Hence det(H) ≥ 0 if and only if 1/N
′(q)−1
β + q ≤ 0 which is equivalent to N
′(q) ≥ 11−βq . But again
the latter holds due to (31). Thus V C is concave.
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(3) From construction of V C on s > xz∗ it is trivial that and V Cs = V
C
x =
1
β(s+x) and henceMV
C = 0.
Then it remains to show LV C ≤ 0. Suppose x 6= 0. A direct evaluation of LV C on sx = z > z
∗
gives
LV C = − ln
1
βx(1 + z)
− 1 +
r
β(1 + z)
+
ρz
β(1 + z)
+
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2β
− (β + λ)
[
1
β
lnx+
1
β
ln(1 + z) +
1
β
[
n(q∗) +
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
− ℓ(0)
]]
+
λ
β
lnx+
λ
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
= (ρ− r)
[
1
β
z
1 + z
]
+
λ
β
ln
[
1
β
−
1
β
z
1 + z
]
+
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2β
−
β + λ
β
n(q∗)
=
β + λ
β
[
m
(
1
β
z
1 + z
)
− n(q∗)
]
≤
β + λ
β
[
m
(
1
β
z∗
1 + z∗
)
− n(q∗)
]
=
β + λ
β
[m(q∗)− n(q∗)] = 0
since m(q) is decreasing on q ≥ q∗ = z
∗
β(1+z∗) and n(q
∗) = m(q∗) by the definition of q∗. The
inequality can be extended to x = 0 by continuity on observing that m
(
1
β
z
1+z
)
= m
(
1
β
s
s+x
)
.
(4) On z ≤ z∗ the candidate value function V C is constructed from n = (n(q))0≤q≤q∗ which by
definition solves LV C = 0. Thus we only have to verify thatMV C = V Cx −V
C
s ≤ 0 on 0 < z ≤ z
∗.
Under the transformation adopted the desired inequality is 1x
(
1
β − (1 + z)g
′(z)
)
≤ 0 which is
equivalent to zg′(z) ≥ zβ(1+z) and in turn q = w(h) = h
′ = zg′(z) ≥ zβ(1+z) or equivalently
z ≤ βq1−βq . But this immediately follows from (29).

Remark 5. While we can extend the definition of LV C to x = 0 by continuity, we do not require MV C
at s = 0. The rationale is that along s = 0 the net equity value of the firm is zero and hence no dividend
can be paid out, i.e. dΦt = 0 is the only admissible strategy whenever St = 0. The marginal utility
contributed by the dividend term MV CdΦt is thus zero.
The following lemma provides some useful results which will facilitate the proof of the verification
theorem.
Lemma 2. (1) For V C defined in Proposition 5 or 7, sV Cs and
1
xV Cx
are bounded everywhere.
(2) Suppose µ 6= ρ or µ = ρ > λ + r such that z∗ > 0. Then
V Cs
sV Css
and
(V Cs )
2
V Css
are bounded on
0 ≤ s ≤ xz∗.
Proof. (1) In the case of µ = ρ ≤ r + λ we have a closed-form expression of V C as in Proposition 5
where the desired results can be established easily.
For the more general case where V C is defined in Proposition 7, on 0 ≤ s ≤ xz∗ we have
sV Cs = zg
′(z) = h′(u) = w(h) ∈ [0, q∗]
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and
1
xV Cx
=
1
1/β − zg′(z)
=
1
1/β − h′(u)
=
1
1/β − w(h)
(32)
which is bounded as w(h) = q ∈ [0, q∗] ⊂ [0, 1/β). Meanwhile, on s > xz∗ V C equals 1β ln(s+ x)
plus a constant such that sV Cs and
1
xV Cx
are trivially bounded.
(2) Similarly,
V Cs
sV Css
=
zg′(z)
z2g′′(z)
=
h′(u)
h′′(u)− h′(u)
=
1
w′(h)− 1
=
1
1/N ′(q)− 1
(33)
which is bounded on 0 < q ≤ q∗ as N ′(q) is continuous, N ′(0) = n
′(0)
β + 1 and n
′(0) is non-zero
from Proposition 4. Finally,
[V Cs ]
2
V Css
=
[zg′(z)]2
z2g′′(z)
=
[h′(u)]2
h′′(u)− h′(u)
=
w(h)
w′(h)− 1
=
q
1/N ′(q)− 1
(34)
which is also bounded on 0 < q ≤ q∗.

We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. To show that V C is indeed the value function, it is sufficient to show that V C is
simultaneously an upper bound and a lower bound of V defined in (10).
(1) In this case the candidate value function is given by (25). We first show that V ≤ V C which
relies on a perturbation argument based on Davis and Norman (1990). Fix ǫ > 0 and define
V˜ C(s, x) := V C(s, x+ ǫ) such that V˜ C is bounded below by V C(0, ǫ) = 1β ln ǫ+
1
β
[
r
β + lnβ − 1
]
.
For an arbitrary admissible strategy (c, π,Φ), let
M˜t :=
∫ t
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du+ e−(λ+β)tV˜ C(St, Xt).
Since V˜ C is C2×1, generalized Ito’s lemma gives
M˜t = M˜0 +
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)u
{
ln cu − V˜
C
x cu + rV˜
C
x Xu + ρV˜
C
s Su + (µ− ρ)V˜
C
s Suπu
+
σ2
2
V˜ CssS
2
uπ
2
u − (β + λ)V˜
C + λF (Xu)
}
du+
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)u(V˜ Cs − V˜
C
x )dΦu
+
∑
υ≤t
e−(β+λ)υ
[
V˜ C(Sυ, Xυ)− V˜
C(Sυ−, Xυ−)− V˜
C
s ∆Sυ − V˜
C
x ∆Xυ
]
+
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)uσπuSuV˜
C
s dBu
=: M˜0 +N
1
t +N
2
t +N
3
t +N
4
t . (35)
Consider a sequence of stopping times Tn := inf{t > 0 :
∫ t
0 (πuSuV˜
C
s )
2du ≥ n} under which the
stopped local martingale N4t∧Tn =
∫ t∧Tn
0
e−(β+λ)uσπuSuV˜
C
s dBu is a true martingale for each n.
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Since
∫ t
0 π
2
udu <∞ and sV
C
s (and in turn sV˜
C
s ) is bounded as shown in part (1) of Lemma 2, we
have Tn ↑ ∞ almost surely.
Using Proposition 5,
MV˜ C(s, x) = V Cx (s, x+ ǫ)− V
C
s (s, x+ ǫ) =MV
C(s, x+ ǫ) = 0
and
LV˜ C = − lnV Cx (s, x+ ǫ)− 1 + rxV
C
x (s, x+ ǫ) + ρsV
C
s (s, x+ ǫ)− (β + λ)f + λF (x)
=
[
− lnV Cx (s, x+ ǫ)− 1 + r(x + ǫ)V
C
x (s, x+ ǫ) + ρsV
C
s (s, x+ ǫ)− (β + λ)f + λF (x+ ǫ)
]
− rǫV Cx (s, x+ ǫ)− λ(F (x + ǫ)− F (x))
≤ −rǫV Cx (s, x+ ǫ)− λ(F (x + ǫ)− F (x)) ≤ 0
where the second last inequality is due to the fact that V C solves LV C = 0 and the last inequality
is due to V C and F being both increasing in x. Thus
N1t ≤
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)uLV˜ Cdu ≤ 0, N2t =
∫ t
0
e−(β+λ)uMV˜ CdΦu = 0.
Moreover, the concavity property of V C is inherited by V˜ C and as such N3t ≤ 0.
Taking expectation on both side of (35) at t ∧ Tn leads to
E
[∫ t∧Tn
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du+ e−(λ+β)(t∧Tn)V˜ C(St∧Tn , Xt∧Tn)
]
= E(M˜t∧Tn) ≤ M˜0 = V˜
C(s, x).
Sending n ↑ ∞, monotone convergence and bounded convergence theorem give respectively
lim
n↑∞
E
[∫ t∧Tn
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du
]
= lim
n↑∞
E
[∫ t∧Tn
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]+
du
]
− lim
n↑∞
E
[∫ t∧Tn
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]−
du
]
= E
[∫ t
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du
]
and
lim
n↑∞
E
[
e−(λ+β)(t∧Tn)V˜ C(St∧Tn , Xt∧Tn)
]
≥ lim
n↑∞
E
[
e−(λ+β)(t∧Tn)min(V˜ C(St∧Tn , Xt∧Tn), 0)
]
= E
[
e−(λ+β)tmin(V˜ C(St, Xt), 0)
]
.
Hence we obtain
E
[∫ t
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du + e−(λ+β)tmin(V˜ C(St, Xt), 0)
]
≤ V˜ C(s, x) = V C(s, x+ ǫ).
On letting t ↑ ∞ and then ǫ ↓ 0, we can conclude
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln cu + λF (Xu)
]
du
]
≤ V C(s, x)
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and for any admissible (c, π,Φ) and thus V (s, x) ≤ V C(s, x).
To show that V C ≤ V it is sufficient to demonstrate an admissible strategy which attains the
candidate value function. Consider the strategy of liquidating the firm by distributing the entire
equity to investors in form of dividends, and then investors consume their private wealth at a rate
of β. In other words, the candidate optimal dividend and consumption policy are given by Φ∗t = s
and c∗t = βX
∗
t respectively for t ≥ 0. The resulting wealth process X
∗ is thus the solution to
dX∗t = (r − β)X
∗
t dt, X
∗
0 = s+ x
and hence X∗t = (s+ x)e
(r−β)t. The candidate optimal consumption policy can be written as
c∗t = βX
∗
t = β(s+ x)e
(r−β)t.
The resulting expected lifetime utility is
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βt ln
(
β(s+ x)e(r−β)t
)
dt
]
=
1
β
ln(s+ x) +
1
β
[
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
]
= V C(s, x).
Thus V C ≤ V .
(2) The proof of V ≤ V C is omitted since it is almost identical to part (1), except that N1t ≤ 0
and N2t ≤ 0 are now established by part (3) and (4) of Proposition 7. To show that V ≥
V C , we again want to demonstrate there exists an admissible strategy under which V C(s, x) =
E
[∫∞
0 e
−(β+λ)t[ln ct + λF (Xt)]dt
]
. Suppose the initial value (s, x) is such that sx ≤ z
∗. Define the
feedback controls c∗ = (c∗t )t≥0, π
∗ = (π∗t )t≥0 as in (8), and Φ
∗ := (Φ∗t )t≥0 an adapted, local time
strategy which keeps StXt ≤ z
∗. By part (2) of Lemma 2, π∗(s, x) and c∗(s, x)/x are bounded and
thus (c∗, π∗) is a pair of valid consumption/investment policy. Denote by (S∗, X∗) = (S∗t , X
∗
t )t≥0
the state variable processes evolving under these controls.
Let M∗t :=
∫ t
0
[
e−(λ+β)u ln c∗u + λF (X
∗
u)
]
du + e−(λ+β)tV C(S∗t , X
∗
t ) be the value process under
(c∗, π∗,Φ∗). Using part (4) of Proposition 7 and the fact that dΦ∗t = 0 on Z
∗
t := S
∗
t /X
∗
t ≤ z
∗,
Ito’s lemma gives M∗t = M
∗
0 +
∫ t
0 σπ
∗
uS
∗
uV
C
s dBu. By part (2) of Lemma 2 the integrand of the
stochastic integral is bounded and thus it is a true martingale such that
E
[∫ t
0
e−(λ+β)u (ln c∗u + λF (X
∗
u)) du
]
+ E
[
e−(λ+β)tV C(S∗t , X
∗
t )
]
= E(M∗t ) =M
∗
0 = V
C(s, x). (36)
To show that (c∗, π∗,Φ∗) is admissible, we want to demonstrate that S∗t ≥ 0 and X
∗
t ≥ 0 for all
t and also T := inf{t ≥ 0 : (S∗t , X
∗
t ) ∈ (0, 0)} =∞. The design of Φ
∗ immediately implies S∗t ≥ 0
and X∗t ≥ 0. Applying Ito’s lemma directly to V
C(S∗t , X
∗
t ) gives
V C(S∗t , X
∗
t ) = V
C(s, x) +
∫ t
0
[
rV Cx X
∗
u + ρV
C
s S
∗
u + (µ− ρ)V
C
s S
∗
uπ
∗
u +
σ2
2
Vss(π
∗
uS
∗
u)
2 − Vxc
∗
u
]
du
+
∫ t
0
(V Cx − V
C
s )dΦ
∗
u + σ
∫ t
0
π∗uV
C
s S
∗
udBu
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= V C(s, x) +
∫ t
0
[
− ln c∗u + (β + λ)V
C − λF (X∗u)
]
du+ σ
∫ t
0
π∗uV
C
s S
∗
udBu
= V C(s, x) +
∫ t
0
[
lnV Cx + (β + λ)V
C − λF (X∗u)
]
du−
µ− ρ
σ
∫ t
0
(V Cs )
2
V Css
dBu
=: V C(s, x) +
∫ t
0
f1(S
∗
u, X
∗
u)du +
∫ t
0
f2(S
∗
u, X
∗
u)dBu (37)
where we have used the fact that LV C = 0 on z ≤ z∗. But
f1(s, x) = lnV
C
x + (β + λ)V
C − λF (x)
= ln
(
1
β
− zg′(z)
)
+ (β + λ)g(z)−
λ
β
(
r
β
+ lnβ − 1
)
= ln
(
1
β
− h′(u)
)
+ (β + λ)h(u) +
r
β
− 1
= ln
(
1
β
− q
)
+ (β + λ)N(q) +
r
β
− 1 = n(q)
which is bounded on q ≤ q∗ and f2(s, x) is bounded as well by part (2) of Lemma 2. Now
V C(S∗t∧T , X
∗
t∧T ) = V
C(s, x) +
∫ t∧T
0
f1(S
∗
u, X
∗
u)du +
∫ t∧T
0
f2(S
∗
u, X
∗
u)dBu
and thus we must have T =∞ because V C(S∗T , X
∗
T ) = V
C(0, 0) = −∞ but the integrands on the
right hand side are bounded.
(37) and the boundedness of f1 and f2 also allow us to deduce the transversality condition
limt→∞ E
[
e−(β+λ)tV C(S∗t , X
∗
t )
]
= 0. Upon taking limit t→∞ in (36) we can conclude V (s, x) ≥
E
[∫∞
0
e−(λ+β)u (ln c∗u + λF (X
∗
u)) du
]
= V C(s, x) on sx ≤ z
∗.
Finally, if the initial value (s, x) is such that sx > z
∗, then consider a strategy of paying a
discrete dividend D∗ = s−z
∗x
1+z∗ at time zero such that the ex-dividend equity to private wealth
ratio is restored to z∗, and then follow the candidate optimal strategies (c∗, π∗,Φ∗) described in
the regime of sx ≤ z
∗ thereafter. By construction of V C on z > z∗, V C(s, x) = V C(s−D∗, x+D∗).
Then (36) gives
E
[∫ t
0
e−(λ+β)u (ln c∗u + λF (X
∗
u)) du
]
+ E
[
e−(λ+β)tV C(S∗t , X
∗
t )
]
= V C(s−D∗, x+D∗) = V C(s, x).
and again we can conclude V (s, x) ≥ V C(s, x).

6. Concluding remarks
We develop a continuous-time stochastic control model which jointly determines the optimal dividend
policy and capital structure of a defaultable firm as well as the consumption strategy of its risk averse
equity investors. We give a complete characterization of the solution to the problem. The optimal dividend
policy is a local time strategy which keeps the ratio of the firm’s equity value to investors’ wealth below
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a target threshold. Comparative statics of economic importance are derived where the impact of default
risk on the corporate policies is highlighted. A firm facing a higher default risk has stronger incentive to
pay out dividends aggressively as a precautionary move to preserve value for investors against potential
default. To offset the negative effect on investment due to the shrunk equity basis, the firm adopts a
higher leverage level to boost its return. This feature can potentially be interesting to mainstream finance
literature as dividends and leverage decision of a firm now reflect its riskiness (default probability), and
hence they could have important asset pricing implications.
We have exclusively focused on the equity value evolution without considering the payoff to the bond-
holders. In particular, the corporate yield ρ is a given constant. A possible variant of the current model
may involve bondholders who understand the default probability of the firm and adjust the cost of debt
accordingly. An example of the modeling strategy can be found in Lambrecht and Tse (2018), where
risk-neutral bondholders charge a fair corporate yield as a function of the leverage level π and default risk
λ. Our analysis can be extended in a similar fashion and this can potentially shed colors on the issues
of agency cost of debt and their impacts on the corporate policies although the analysis might then rely
more heavily on numerical studies.
Investors have logarithm utility function in the current model. A natural and tempting extension
of the model is to consider a more general power utility function such that the effect of risk aversion
can be investigated. Unfortunately, it appears difficult to apply the same set of transformation scheme
to facilitate the analysis of the HJB system since the “bequest” term λF (x) now has a multiplicative
(rather than additive) form and the resulting first order system n′ = O(q, n) is much more complicated.
Moreover, we also expect that under power utility function the issue of well-posedness will lead to extra
complications of the problem.4 Identification of the exact conditions under which well-posedness holds
for stochastic control problems of this type has historically been a very difficult task. For example,
since the rigorous formulation of the Merton consumption/investment problem under transaction costs by
Davis and Norman (1990), it has taken more than two decades for the precise well-posedness conditions
to be established by Choi et al. (2013). A full generalization of the model in the current paper to power
utility function should prove to be a challenging open problem for future research.
In our framework, the only outside investment option available for the investors is the retail saving
account. Another possible direction of future research is to allow equity investors to also invest in another
risky market asset which can potentially be correlated to the risky asset of the firm. While it is expected
that the extra dimension introduced will bring significant challenges to the analysis of the underlying
HJB equation, it is perhaps not an impossible task in view of the recent progress by Hobson et al. (2016)
4For utility function in form of u(c) = c1−R/(1 − R) where R ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} is the risk aversion level, the parameter
combination of R < 1 and β ≤ (1−R)r leads to an ill-posed problem since the deterministic optimal consumption problem
under such parameters is ill-posed and thus a version of the problem with the defaultable firm is also ill-posed.
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who completely solve a multi-asset Merton problem with transaction costs (albeit the special case where
transaction cost is only payable for one of the assets).
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7. Appendix
7.1. A bound of n. The following lemma will be useful when establishing the proofs related to the
dependence of the optimal controls on the state variables.
Lemma 3. Suppose µ 6= ρ and recall the notations introduced in Proposition 4. Let χ(q) := n(q)− ℓ(q).
Then χ(q) ≤ αq for 0 ≤ q ≤ q∗ where α is defined to be the positive root to the quadratic equation (24).
Proof. On differentiating both side of (22), setting q → 0 and applying L’Hopital’s rule we can obtain
χ′′(0+) = −
β2(µ− ρ)2
4(β + λ)2σ2α2
χ′′(0+)−
β3
β + λ
which give
χ′′(0+) = −
β3/(β + λ)
1 + β
2(µ−ρ)2
4(β+λ)2σ2α2
< 0.
Hence χ is concave near q = 0 and then χ must be initially lying below L(q) := χ′(0)q = αq.
Write the ODE (22) as χ′(q) = Oˆ(q, χ(q)). Then
Oˆ(q, L(q)) = Oˆ(q, αq) =
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
−
β
1− βq
(
βq −
λ
β + λ
)
=
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
−
1
λ+ β
β3q
1− βq
+
λβ
λ+ β
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≤
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
+
λβ
λ+ β
=
A(0, 0)
α
+B(0) = α = L′(q).
Thus χ(q) can only downcross L(q) and from this we conclude χ(q) ≤ L(q) = αq.

7.2. Dependence of the optimal controls on the state variables.
Proof of Proposition 1. (1) Recall from Proposition 4 that q∗ ∈
(
1
β
(ρ−r−λ)+
(ρ−r−λ)++λ ,
1
β
)
. The result follows
immediately under the relationship z∗ = βq
∗
1−βq∗ .
(2) The result mainly follows from part (2) of Lemma 2 that
π∗(s, x) =
µ− ρ
σ2
[
−
Vs
sVss
]
=
µ− ρ
σ2
[
−
zg′(z)
z2g′′(z)
]
=:
µ− ρ
σ2
θ(z) (38)
such that θ(z) = − zg
′(z)
z2g′′(z) =
1
1−1/N ′(q) which is positive, strictly larger than one and bounded
since N ′ is a positive function bounded away from 1 on q ∈ (0, q∗].
It remains to show that θ(z) is decreasing in z which is equivalent to showing that N ′(q) is
increasing in q. By definition of N , we can obtain N ′′(q) = n
′′(q)
β +
β
(1−βq)2 . We work out the
second derivative of n as
n′′(q) =
d
dq
O(q, n(q)) =
d
dq
[
β2q
1− βq
m(q)− n(q)
n(q)− ℓ(q)
]
=
d
dq
{
β2q
1− βq
[
m(q)− ℓ(q)
n− ℓ(q)
− 1
]}
=
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
[n(q)− ℓ(q)]− q[n′(q)− ℓ′(q)]
[n(q)− ℓ(q)]2
−
β2
(1− βq)2
and hence
N ′′(q) =
β
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
[n(q)− ℓ(q)]− q[n′(q)− ℓ′(q)]
[n(q)− ℓ(q)]2
=
β
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
χ(q)− qχ′(q)
[χ(q)]2
where χ(q) := n(q)− ℓ(q) as introduced in the proof of Proposition 4. Hence to show that N ′ is
increasing it is necessary and sufficient to show that χ′(q) ≤ χ(q)q for all 0 < q ≤ q
∗.
Suppose on contrary that there exists q¯ ∈ (0, q∗] such that χ′(q¯) > χ(q¯)q¯ =: α¯. From Lemma 3,
χ(q) ≤ αq for q ∈ (0, q¯] where α := χ′(0) and thus we must have α¯ ≤ α. Let L(q) := α¯q. Then
we have L′(q¯) = α¯ < χ′(q¯) and hence χ(q) upcrosses L(q) at q = q¯.
Since χ′(0) = α > α¯, χ(q) must initially be large than L(q) for q near zero. Hence there must
exist some q˜ < q¯ where χ downcrosses L at q = q˜. But, recall the definition of Oˆ in (22),
α¯ < χ′(q¯) = Oˆ(q¯, χ(q¯)) = Oˆ(q¯, α¯q¯)
=
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α¯
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
−
β
1− βq¯
(
βq¯ −
λ
β + λ
)
=
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α¯
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
−
1
λ+ β
β3q¯
1− βq¯
+
λβ
λ+ β
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<
β2
β + λ
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2α¯
−
β
β + λ
(
ρ− r +
(µ− ρ)2
2σ2
)
−
1
λ+ β
β3q˜
1− βq˜
+
λβ
λ+ β
= Oˆ(q˜, α¯q˜) = Oˆ(q˜, χ(q˜)) = χ′(q˜).
But this contradicts the fact that χ downcrosses L at q = q˜.
(3) The result is immediate from (32) where
c∗(s, x)
x
=
1
1/β − zg′(z)
=
1
1/β − q
. (39)
The above is increasing in q and in turn z and it tends to β as q ↓ 0 or equivalently z ↓ 0.

Proof of Proposition 2. q∗ = ρ−r−λβ(ρ−r) under µ = ρ > λ+r and hence z
∗ = βq
∗
1−βq∗ =
ρ−r−λ
λ . π
∗ = 0 is trivial
when µ = ρ. Finally, the expression of c∗(s, x) can be established using (39) and the fact that n = m
when µ = ρ > λ+ r. Thus (29) in Lemma 1 can be further simplified to
z = z(q) =
βq
1− βq
exp
(
−
∫ ρ−r−λ
β(ρ−r)
q
m′(v)
βv
dv
)
=
βq
1− βq
exp
[
−
∫ ρ−r−λ
β(ρ−r)
q
1
β + λ
(
ρ− r
v
−
λ
v(1− βv)
)
dv
]
(40)
and we can arrive at (9).

7.3. Comparative statics.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the case of µ = ρ > λ+ r, z∗ = ρ−r−λλ and π
∗ = 0 and hence their comparative
statics are trivial. While it may be less trivial to deduce the comparative statics of c∗(s, x) directly from
(9), one trick is to observe its integral form as in (40) to deduce that z = z(q) is increasing in λ and
r. As z = z(q) is an increasing bijection, its inverse function q = q(z) is decreasing in λ and r. This
monotonicity is then inherited by c∗(s, x) = x1/β−q(s/x;λ,r) .
Now we proceed to give the proof in the general case of µ 6= ρ:
(1) Recall that the transformed value function n is the solution to the ODE n′ = O(q, n) where O
is defined in Proposition 4, and the transformed dividend payment boundary is given by q∗ :=
inf{q > 0 : n(q) ≥ m(q)}.
Let b(q) := β+λβ (m(q)−n(q)). Then the ODE becomesm
′(q)− ββ+λb
′(q) = O
(
q,m(q)− ββ+λb(q)
)
which can be written as
b′(q) = ρ− r −
λ
1− βq
−
(β + λ)βq
1− βq
b(q)
(µ−ρ)2
2σ2
(
1
β − q
)
− b(q)
=: P (q, b(q)) (41)
subject to initial condition b(0) = β+λβ (m(0) − ℓ(0)) =
(µ−ρ)2
2βσ2 . The dividend payment boundary
can now be expressed as q∗ := inf{q > 0 : b(q) ≤ 0}. Note that P (q, b) is decreasing in λ for as
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long as 0 ≤ (µ−ρ)
2
2σ2
(
1
β − q
)
which must be satisfied along the solution trajectory b = (b(q))0≤q≤q∗
since the transformed value function n = n(q) always lies between m(q) and ℓ(q) on [0, q∗].
Consider λhi > λlo and denote by bhi (resp. blo) the solution to the ODE b′ = P (q, b(q);λhi)
(resp. b′ = P (q, b(q);λlo)) with initial condition b(0) = (µ−ρ)
2
2βσ2 . Since P (q, b;λ
hi) < P (q, b;λlo),
bhi can only downcross blo. Thus bhi is dominated by blo at least up to min(q∗hi, q
∗
lo), where
q∗hi := inf{q > 0 : b
hi(q) ≤ 0} (and q∗lo is defined similarly). Hence we must have q
∗
hi < q
∗
lo from
which we conclude q∗ and in turn z∗ = βq
∗
1−βq∗ are both decreasing in λ.
The exact same argument can be used to establish the comparative statics of z∗ with respect
to µ, σ and r. From (41) it is easy to see that P (q, b) is increasing in (µ−ρ)
2
σ2 (while keeping all
the other parameters fixed) and is decreasing in r. The result follows immediately.
(2) From (38), (µ − ρ)π∗(s, x) ∝ 11−1/N ′(q) and hence to show that (µ − ρ)π
∗ is increasing in λ it
is sufficient to show that N ′(q) = N ′(q(z;λ);λ) is decreasing in λ. Using the substitution of
b(q) := β+λβ (m(q)− n(q)) again, we have
N ′(q;λ) =
n′(q;λ)
β
+
1
1− βq
=
m′(q;λ) − ββ+λb
′(q;λ)
β
+
1
1− βq
=
βq
1− βq
b(q;λ)
(µ−ρ)2
2σ2
(
1
β − q
)
− b(q;λ)
+
1
1− βq
and thus N ′(q;λ) is decreasing in λ under a fixed q as b(q;λ) is decreasing in λ as shown in part
(1) of this proof. Then
d
dλ
N ′(q(λ);λ) =
∂
∂λ
N ′(q(λ);λ) +
∂
∂q
N ′(q(λ);λ)
∂
∂λ
q(λ) < 0
since q(λ) is decreasing in λ and N ′(q) is increasing in q as already shown in part (1) of this proof
and part (2) of the proof of Proposition 1 respectively. Similarly, we can show that (µ − ρ)π∗ is
increasing in r.
(3) From (39) the optimal consumption rate per unit wealth is given by c
∗(s,x)
x =
1
1/β−q . We first
show that the expression is decreasing in λ which is equivalent to showing that q = q(z;λ) is
decreasing in λ.
Using (29) and the substitution of b(q) := β+λβ (m(q)− n(q)) again, we have
z = z(q;λ) =
βq
1− βq
exp

− ∫ q∗(λ)
q

 β
1− βv
b(v;λ)
(µ−ρ)2
2σ2
(
1
β − v
)
− b(v;λ)

 dv

 .
We have shown in part (1) of the proof that both q∗(λ) and b( · ;λ) are decreasing in λ. Hence
z = z(q;λ) is increasing in λ. As z = z(q;λ) is increasing in q, q = q(z;λ) is decreasing in λ.
Hence the result follows. Using the exact same argument, it can be shown that q = q(z; r) and in
turn c
∗(s,x)
x are decreasing in r.

